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DETERRING MURDER: A REPLY
Cass R. Sunstein* and Adrian Vermeule**
We are most grateful to John Donohue, Justin Wolfers, and Carol Steiker
for their valuable and illuminating responses to our article.' Donohue and
Wolfers explore empirical questions, 2 on which we have little to say. Steiker
investigates the moral issues, 3 and here our Reply must be more extensive.
Donohue and Wolfers believe that, with respect to the death penalty,
"existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly fragile." 4 They attack the peerreviewed empirical work of a number of social scientists, including Hashem
Dezhbakhsh, Paul Rubin, Joanna Shepherd, H. Naci Mocan, R. Kaj Gittings,
and Paul Zimmerman. 5 They highlight theoretical claims by Lawrence Katz,
Steven Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich, who emphasize the infrequency of
capital punishment and who thus doubt the claim of deterrence. 6 (Interestingly,
Katz, Levitt, and Shusterovich do find that prison deaths have massive effects
in deterring murders and other crimes. 7) Most importantly, their own work,
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, the University of Chicago Law
School, Department of Political Science, and the College.
** Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. The authors thank
Tracey Meares for helpful conversations.
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using existing data, suggests that deterrence has not been shown.
Donohue and Wolfers misunderstand the point of our article. Let us
distinguish among three purposes for which one might discuss the recent
deterrence evidence: (1) to argue that, in fact, capital punishment deters
murder; (2) to argue that the evidence has reached a threshold of reliability
such that policymakers should change laws now, adopting capital punishment;
and (3) to argue that the evidence has reached a threshold of reliability, much
lower than in (2), such that it is worthwhile to consider the moral implications
of the evidence. We do not mean to take a stand on either (1) or (2). We do not
know whether deterrence has been shown; and contrary to Donohue and
Wolfers's suggestion, we do not insist "that it would be irresponsible for
government to fail to act upon the studies." 8 Nor do we conclude that the
evidence of deterrence has reached some threshold of reliability that permits or
requires government action upon it right now.9 Plainly, Donohue and Wolfers
have a quarrel with other social scientists, but not with us--except, perhaps,
insofar as we are willing to
take the recent evidence as a motivation for
10
rethinking the moral issues.
Suppose that Donohue and Wolfers are fundamentally right and that their
own analysis shows that current evidence of deterrence is weak. Even if that
were true, we could certainly imagine a regime of capital punishment that

8. Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 2, at 794. We do argue that definitive evidence
should not be required for policymakers to take action, but that is a far more modest claim.
9. Compare id. ("This empirical evidence leads to the heart of [Sunstein and
Vermeule's] claim that it would be irresponsible for government to fail to act upon the
studies and vigorously prosecute the death penalty."), with Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note
1, at 715 ("In any event, our goal here is not to reach a final judgment about the evidence. It
is to assess capital punishment given the assumption of a substantial deterrent effect. In what
follows, therefore, we will stipulate to the validity of the evidence, and consider its
implications for morality and law.").
10. Donohue and Wolfers take a number of quotations out of context, so as to give the
impression that we have a strong commitment to the recent studies:
While Lawrence Katz, Steven Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich found no robust evidence in
favor of deterrence, several researchers claim to have uncovered compelling evidence to the
contrary. This latter research appears to have found favor with Cass Sunstein and Adrian
Vermeule, who describe it as "powerful" and "impressive," and they refer to "many decades'
worth of data about [capital punishment's] deterrent effects." While they claim not to endorse
any specific analysis, these "sophisticated multiple regression studies" are "[t]he foundation
of [their] argument," and they specifically rely on many of the recent studies that we will reexamine as buttressing their premise that "capital punishment powerfully deters killings."
Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 2, at 793-94 (internal citations omitted).
We hope that, taken as a whole, our essay shows a kind of interested agnosticism. We
cannot help but add that as new entrants into the death penalty debate, we are struck by the
intensity of people's beliefs on the empirical issues, and the extent to which their empirical
judgments seem to be driven by their moral commitments. Those who oppose the death
penalty on moral grounds often seem entirely unwilling to consider apparent evidence of
deterrence and are happy to dismiss such evidence whenever even modest questions are
raised about it. Those who accept the death penalty on moral grounds often seem to accept
the claim of deterrence whether or not good evidence has been provided on its behalf.
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would, in fact, deter homicides. It is worthwhile to ask how the moral issues
should be assessed ifdeterrence could be established. In any case, one of our
central goals is theoretical. We aim to use the area of capital punishment as a
way of challenging the act/omission distinction in the context of government
decisions.1 1 Our hope is that this challenge is relevant to a wide range of issues,
not merely capital punishment. In our view, regulation is pervaded by life-life
tradeoffs, and criminal law is illuminatingly analyzed as a form of regulation.
Carol Steiker does not accept this latter claim, and hence she engages our
arguments directly. 12 But she does not defend the act/omission distinction. For
government, at least, she seems to agree that this distinction is unhelpful, at
least outside the context of criminal justice. Even for criminal justice, she does
not insist on the value of the act/omission distinction. 13 Nonetheless, she rejects
our argument on three grounds. The first involves what she sees as the need to
distinguish between purposeful and nonpurposeful acts. 14 The second points to
considerations of justice that seem to raise serious doubts about capital
punishment. 15 The third involves slippery slopes that, in her view, make our
argument unacceptable. 16 We take up these claims in sequence.
Purposeful versus nonpurposeful action. Steiker notes that in the criminal
law, it is entirely standard to distinguish between purposeful and nonpurposeful
acts. Those who purposefully cause harm are punished more severely than
those who are negligent or even reckless. Steiker believes that the same
distinction, pointing to different degrees of mens rea, greatly matters when the
government is the actor. A government that takes life is doing so purposefully,
whereas a government that fails to protect life is acting negligently or at worst
recklessly.1 7' Steiker is puzzled that we seem to ignore this conventional"quotidian" 8-- distinction. Because capital punishment involves the purposeful
taking of life, and because the failure to impose capital punishment does not,
Steiker believes that it is wrong to speak of life-life tradeoffs in this context.19
We shall argue that even though the distinction between purposeful and
nonpurposeful actions is important for the purpose of criminal punishment, it is
not important for the purpose of evaluating what governments should be doing.
A government that negligently fails to prevent hurricane damage may be less
blameworthy than a government that chooses to create hurricane damage, but

11. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 719-28.
12. Steiker, supra note 3, at 753.
13. Id. at 754 ("Rather, Sunstein and Vermeule's argument runs into serious problems
when they attempt to transplant their insight about government agency from the arena of
civil regulation to the arena of criminal justice.").
14. Id. at 756-63.
15. Id. at 763-74.
16. Id. at 774-82.
17. Id. at 757-58.
18. Id. at 759.
19. Id. at 762.
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governments that have failed to prevent hurricane damage had better start doing
so. As a preliminary matter, two closely related points are important to
underline: (1) where governments are concerned, the distinction between acts
and omissions is both conceptually obscure and morally irrelevant; 20 and (2)
governments do not have "intentions" or "purposes," at least not in the way that
people do. 2 1 Steiker stipulates to the first point, 22 but she may not fully
appreciate its force. In our view, the first point, properly appreciated, requires
acceptance of the second point as well.
As for the first: Suppose that we have rejected the act/omission distinction
for governments and that we accept the evidence of deterrence for purposes of
argument. It follows that, where government chooses not to adopt a policy of
capital punishment that would deter significant deaths, 23 government is itself
acting with willful disregard of the resulting deaths. True, government does not
know the precise identities of the victims, but that should be neither here nor
there. A lifeguard who left her post, knowing to a practical certainty that a
number of people would predictably drown as a result, would be a murderer,
even if the identities of the victims were unknown ex ante. Steiker recognizes
that, under the Model Penal Code and in most jurisdictions, conduct of this sort
would itself constitute legal "murder." 24 Perhaps such conduct would not be
murder in the first degree, depending upon the relevant criminal code and upon
the factual details. But it is unclear why that legal difference is relevant and
unclear why it should underwrite a wholesale objection to capital punishment at
the level of policy evaluation. We return to this point shortly.
As for the second point: In the example above, we have treated government
as a really big person, as does Steiker. It is worth underscoring, however, that
the same structural features of government policymaking that render the
act/omission distinction obscure, for government, also render the distinctions
among various shadings of culpable intention obscure, for government. Steiker
claims to accept, at least for the sake of argument, that the act/omission
distinction fails for governments. But Steiker then uses unusual locutions about
governmental intention, referring to governmental mens rea 25 (What mens
could possibly be referred to here?) and to the "'intent' of capital punishment
statutes." 26 In our view, Steiker's own quotation marks around "intent" indicate
a healthy recognition that a metaphor has been stretched beyond the breaking

20. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 721 ("The distinction between acts and
omissions may not be intelligible in this [government] context, and even if it is, the
distinction does not make a morally relevant difference.").
21. Id. at722.
22. Steiker, supra note 3, at 756.
23. Here, we bracket the diminishing marginal effect of additional executions, as we
discuss in our article. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 709 n.10.
24. Steiker, supra note 3, at 756 & n. 16.
25. Id. at 758.
26. Id. at 760.
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point. Individuals qua individuals have intentions to take actions, as do
individual officials. But government itself is not a person, and the underlying
individual actions are usually inputs into complicated collective
decisionmaking processes, such as voting in legislatures and multimember
courts. The outputs of such processes need not correspond to anyone's
individual intentions and are hard to classify into the fine shades that the
criminal law uses for assessing the culpability of individual intentions.
Steiker rightly observes that people speak about degrees of culpable
27
intention with respect to government policy, as in the case of disaster relief.
But the question is whether this freighted talk is really about individual-level
morality or is instead a kind of shorthand or heuristic for evaluating
complicated institutional questions, such as whether particular governmental
officials are acting as faithful agents for the polity as whole. Steiker assumes
the former, but in our view the latter is more plausible. Moralized talk about
whether "governmental" intentions are culpable is metaphorical shorthand for
institutional criticism and for moral criticism of particular individuals who
happen to occupy government posts. In pressing the distinction between
purposeful and nonpurposeful action for government actors, Steiker takes the
metaphor too literally.
Let us put these points aside; still, we believe that Steiker's argument from
mens rea is unconvincing. No one doubts that mens rea matters in the criminal
law. Whatever the foundations of punishment, special sanctions should be
imposed on intentional wrongdoing;
the decision to do so can be defended on
28
grounds of both deterrence
and retribution. Steiker rightly contends that
"those who purposefully transgress are more blameworthy." 29 But how does
this claim bear on our argument? A governor of a state may well be more
blameworthy if he intentionally causes a disaster than if he stands by and
negligently allows a disaster to occur. But no one is talking about the
appropriate punishment of governors or about how much to "blame" individual
public officials. The question is how to evaluate official policies. Let us
stipulate that a mayor who encourages and promotes domestic violence is more
blameworthy than one who negligently permits such violence to occur. But
how does that point relate to the evaluation of policies to control domestic
violence-or to the legitimacy of capital punishment? Even if we accept the
view that the criminal law should distinguish between purposeful and
nonpurposeful action, it hardly follows that the government should decline to
impose capital punishment if the effect of its decision is to condemn significant

27. Id. at 758 ("Everyone acknowledges that the government cannot disclaim
responsibility for the disaster in New Orleans on the ground that its failure to maintain the

levees was merely an omission for which it was not responsible.").
28. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
29. Steiker, supra note 3, at 758.
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numbers of innocent people to death.
In other words, the distinction between purposeful and nonpurposeful
action is drawn for particular purposes, not in the abstract. Suppose that a
standardized test is graded incorrectly, and the question is whether the incorrect
grade should be changed. The usual answer is that it should indeed be changed;
that answer does not depend on the state of mind of the initial grader (maybe it
was a computer). Now suppose the question is the right mix of policies to
discourage crime. The answer to that question does not turn on the state of
mind of the government officials who developed the initial policy. If officials
have negligently adopted a policy that allows one group of people-say,
Hispanics, women, or gays and lesbians-to be subject to criminal violence,
they had better change that policy, even if the resulting punishments are
adopted intentionally and the earlier policy caused harm only as a result of
negligence.
Justice. Steiker's more fundamental objection is that public executions are
unjust. To support this conclusion, she makes three independent arguments.
First, she contends that all criminal sentences must be proportionate to the
crime. In her view, capital punishment is not proportionate in view of the
difficult circumstances of those who are subject to it. Victims of capital
punishment
very frequently are extremely intellectually limited, are suffering from some
form of mental illness, are in the powerful grip of a drug or alcohol addiction,
are survivors of childhood abuse, or are the victims of some sort of societal
deprivation (be it poverty, racism, poor education,
inadequate health care, or
30
some noxious combination of the above.).
Steiker's plea for proportionality is meant as a deontological check on
permissible punishments. Second, Steiker argues that capital punishment
suffers from a failure of equality because of racial disparities in its
administration. Here she points to evidence that African-American defendants,
and also those defendants who kill white people, are disproportionately likely
to receive the death penalty. 3 1 Third, Steiker contends that capital punishment
violates human dignity. On this count, her preferred argument is that the death
penalty "destroy[s] the distinctive human capacities of the society" that
32
administers it.
With respect to dignity, the problem with capital punishment is
33
not what it does to convicted criminals; it is "what it does to all of us."
We accept many of Steiker's concerns, but we do not think that she has
offered a convincing response to our arguments. Steiker contends that the death
penalty represents a failure of proportionality, in part because of the
deprivations frequently faced by those who commit the most heinous

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 766.
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 772.
Id.
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murders. 34 Nothing in our arguments is inconsistent with the suggestion that a
proportionality requirement should constrain permissible punishments; given
certain circumstances, such a requirement might have good consequences,
deontological justifications, or both. But suppose, not implausibly, that some or
many hostage takers are mentally ill, drug addicts, or otherwise products of
severe deprivation. Would it follow that police officers should not be permitted
to kill hostage takers? 35 Now suppose that capital punishment saves lives. If so,
many of those who would be saved also face severe deprivation; not
irrelevantly, one deprivation that they would otherwise face involves the loss of
their life. Why should they be sacrificed for the sake of their killers? 36 This last
question suggests that Steiker's deontological sympathies include an
unacknowledged baseline. Steiker seems to assume that capital punishment
"uses" murderers for the sake of innocent people. But it would be equally
plausible to say that an abolition of capital punishment "uses" innocent people
for the sake of murderers.
In any case, Steiker's proportionality argument would seem to raise serious
questions about life imprisonment as well. Life imprisonment, especially
without hope of parole, might be disproportionate to any offense if an
offender's deprived background is taken into account. And it is reasonable to
think that those who are subject to life imprisonment "frequently are extremely
intellectually limited, are suffering from some form of mental illness, are in the
powerful grip of a drug or alcohol addiction, are survivors of childhood abuse,
or are the victims of some sort of societal deprivation." 37 Is life imprisonment
to that extent unacceptable, in Steiker's view? A proportionality argument
would certainly prohibit capital punishment for minor crimes, and perhaps for
all crimes short of the most egregious murders, but the view that it forbids
capital punishment for those murders must be parasitic on some independent,
and suppressed, normative argument that capital punishment is always and
everywhere impermissible (at least on certain assumptions about the

34. Id. at 781-82.
35. We do not understand Steiker's rejection of our analogy to hostage takers. See id.
at 762 n.40, 783 n.106. For our analogy, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 740
("Police officers are permitted to kill those who have taken hostages, at least if the killing is
reasonably believed to be necessary to save human lives. If capital punishment is deemed
different, it might be because the lives to be saved are merely statistical, as compared with
the lives of hostages, which are entirely vivid."). Steiker refers to self-defense, Steiker, supra
note 3, at 758 n.21, but it is permissible to kill hostage takers to protect hostages, not merely
oneself. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 2005), quoted by Steiker, supra note 3,
at 758 n.21. Steiker contends that one can kill hostage takers even when there are more
hostage takers than hostages, Steiker, supra note 3, at 758 n.21, but that fact makes our
argument a fortiori. Steiker adds that hostage situations are emergencies that feature
imminent threats, id. at 783 n.106, but the expansion of the temporal horizon does not
undermine the analogy so long as evidence of deterrence is convincing.
36. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1,at 708 (introducing the concept of a "lifelife tradeoff" in the capital punishment debate).
37. Steiker, supra note 3, at 766.
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backgrounds of those subject to it). That is not a proportionality claim: it is a
substantive bar on a particular type of punishment, no matter how proportional
it may be. At bottom, it is a conclusion, not an argument.
Issues of racial equality are certainly important in this domain, and hence
we emphasize that if deterrence occurs, African-Americans have more to gain
from capital punishment than white people do. 3 8 Steiker replies that racial
animus plays a role in the imposition of capital punishment, whereas most
murders of African-Americans do not have any such racial component.3 9 It is
not clear that her premise is correct. If African-Americans disproportionately
are victims of murder, a racially discriminatory past is almost certainly a
contributing factor, and there is reason to wonder about a criminal justice
system that does not provide African-Americans equal protection against the
risk of homicide. In addition, the term "racial animus" may not be40 an apt

description of existing inequalities in the system of capital punishment.

But let us grant Steiker her premises. What follows? Is capital punishment
impermissible on grounds of equality if it turns out that (a) its administration is
infected by racial bias, but (b) African-Americans are disproportionately
beneficiaries of its deterrent effect? That conclusion seems implausible. If
racial animus is present, the natural solution is to eliminate racial bias, not to
eliminate capital punishment. And if that solution proves impossible, a small
racial bias in administration of the death penalty might not be fatal if that
penalty has a large "tilt" toward protection of the lives of innocent AfricanAmericans. Suppose that a particular penalty provides massive and
disproportionate protection to Catholics but that the penalty is, occasionally,
imposed on Catholics just because of anti-Catholic animus. Should the penalty
be eliminated as a way of preventing discrimination against Catholics? This is
hardly clear, especially if a feasible alternative is simply to police
the penalty's
41
imposition more closely to root out animus in specific cases.

38. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 730.
39. Steiker, supra note 3, at 769.
40. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) ("At most, the Baldus study
indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing
are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system... . In light of the safeguards designed
to minimize racial bias in the process ....
we hold that the Baldus study does not
demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital
sentencing process."). We do not mean to take a stand on this question; we simply suggest
that the idea of "racial animus" is contested in this domain.
41. There are complex issues in the background here about the relationship between
discrimination and deterrence. Suppose that white murderers, and those who kill AfricanAmericans, are less likely to receive the death penalty. If so, these actors will face less
deterrence, in a way that will (assuming that deterrence occurs) lead to more murders by
whites and more murders of African-Americans. Or suppose that African-American
murderers, and those who kill whites, are unusually likely to receive the death penalty. If so,
there will be extra deterrence of African-American murderers (in a way that might help
African-American victims, since most murders are not cross-racial) and extra deterrence of
murders of white people (in a way that will not help African-American victims). Our
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Steiker's dignity argument 42 is not our absolute favorite, because we fail to
see what it adds to her other claims. True, it is possible to assert that capital
punishment, by its very nature, threatens the human capacities of societies that
use it. Steiker does not contend that this is an empirical claim; she is not
arguing that capital punishment actually has harmful effects on society's
capacities. If her claim is not empirical, what kind of argument is it, and what
does it add to her other objections to the death penalty? We assume that Steiker
also believes that a society's human capacities are undermined if that society
fails to prevent homicide. Now suppose that capital punishment deters
significant numbers of murders; if so, the failure to use it is plausibly taken as a
threat to the human capacities of societies that fail to stop preventable murders.
Steiker here seems to reassert the distinction between government acts and
government omissions, despite her earlier acknowledgement that the distinction
should be abandoned. With the appeal to human dignity, it is not clear that
Steiker has supplied a distinctive argument against the death penalty.
Slippery slopes. Steiker concludes with a set of slippery slope arguments.
She believes that the logic of our argument would require execution of innocent
people, including members of the killer's family. 43 Let us suppose, with
Steiker, that significant deterrence would result from a system in which the
state executed not only offenders but also their spouses and their children.
Nothing in our argument is inconsistent with the claim that there is a
deontological check on deliberate decisions to execute innocent people. On any
theory, the killing of innocent people is a prima facie moral wrong. What we do
insist upon is the presence of life-life tradeoffs; we are discussing the particular
context of decisions to protect people from being killed. We therefore
emphasize that (1) killing is on both sides of the question where governmental
rules about capital punishment are concerned, because government cannot help
but act; 44 and that (2) almost all deontological views recognize a
consequentialist override to deontological rules. 45 We have hardly argued for
execution of innocent people. But if the execution of an innocent person were
genuinely necessary to save an exceedingly large number of people (10,000,
100,000, or 100 million?), we believe that the execution might well be justified,
and we doubt that Steiker would disagree. For both consequentialists and
deontologists, the killing of innocent people could be justified in some
imaginable world.

assumption here is that race-neutral deterrence is best and that a discriminatory system of

capital punishment is a problem, even if it might lead, on some assumptions, to benefits for
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
42. Steiker, supra note 3, at 772 ("Extreme punishments violate human dignity
because they destroy the distinctive human capacities of the society in whose name they are
publicly inflicted.").
43. Id. at 775.
44. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 749.
45. Id. at 716-17.
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But in our world, it is exceedingly unlikely that such a justification could
ever be convincing, even on consequentialist grounds. 46 As we have
emphasized, the execution of innocent people would dilute the deterrent signal
that the consequentialist wishes to strengthen. 47 As Rawls emphasizes, a policy
48
of that sort would itself have systemic costs that would affect its desirability.
If the conse uentialist objection to the killing of innocents is "unsatisfactorily
contingent,"19 so be it; almost all consequentialist arguments are contingent, in
the sense that they depend on (contingent) consequences. And as we have
noted, our argument is consistent with the claim that deontological arguments
forbid the execution of innocent people, so long as the override threshold is not
met. What we emphasize is that the situation with capital punishment is most
unlikely to require execution of the innocent, in which case the deontological
position is unaffected.
In any case, policy evaluation should not be driven by bizarre hypotheticals
of this sort. In the United States, at least, no one is likely to execute innocent
people in order to produce greater deterrence. In reality, the worst possible risk
is that officials will administer a system of capital punishment in which almost
all are guilty, but officials know, at the statistical level, that a very few
(comparatively speaking) innocents may have fallen into the net, yet cannot
practically be sorted from the guilty. The execution of innocents, if it ever
occurs, might be "intentional" or "purposeful" in the sense that an execution is
intentionally or purposefully carried out, but only in that sense; Steiker is not
arguing that officials deliberately execute those they know to be innocent. Even
on Steiker's view, the officials who conduct an execution have a kind of
aggregate-level knowledge without purpose-a state of mind that is less
culpable than a deliberate intention to kill the innocent. On our view, the
execution of any number of innocent people is a good reason to increase the
accuracy of the system of capital punishment. Standing by itself, however, it is
not a sufficient reason to abolish the death penalty if there is strong evidence of
deterrence.
Finally, it is important to see that innocence is on both sides of the issue
here. We have emphasized that if capital punishment deters murders, it saves
innocent lives, perhaps many more than would be saved by abolishing capital
punishment. If Steiker really accepts that government omissions are to be
evaluated on par with government acts, then she faces a tradeoff between the

46. Steiker also devotes considerable space to the suggestion that consequentialists
might, in the end, reject capital punishment, because such punishment might not ultimately
result in a net saving of lives. Steiker, supra note 3, at 785-88. Our argument is based on the
assumption that a net saving occurs; if it does not, we agree that there is no good moral
argument for capital punishment.
47. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 735-37.
48. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REv. 3, 32 & n.27 (1955); see
also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 735-36 (discussing Rawls's argument).
49. Steiker, supra note 3, at 775-76.
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few innocent lives that might occasionally be lost under capital punishment and
the innocent lives (certainly far more numerous) that capital punishment will
save.
Most generally, Steiker reads us to say "that there is nothing intrinsically
wrong with individuals or governments 'using' the lives of some to promote the
greater good."50 In so saying, she appears to suggest that we reject the
deontological claim that people should be treated as ends rather than merely as
a means. But we do not believe that this claim is properly or even plausibly
understood to forbid punishment that is motivated in part by deterrence goals.
Suppose that the government imposes life imprisonment on certain rapists,
partly because it believes that life imprisonment will deter people from being
rapists. Is the government "using" the lives of rapists to promote the general
good, and, if it is, does Steiker mean to condemn that? If it is legitimate to
punish wrongdoers in part to deter wrongdoing, then our argument should not
violate any principle against the "use" of human lives. Steiker goes far be 1ond
the deontological imperative against treating people merely as a means; 5 " she
comes close to saying that it is always morally impermissible to consider
consequences in choosing criminal punishments-a view that would bar
deterrence-based justifications for the issuance of parking tickets.
We have tried to offer an account of capital punishment that is agnostic
about the contest between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist accounts of
morality. Our minimal claim is that, in evaluating criminal penalties, deterrence
should play a significant role in moral judgments, even for those whose central
commitment is to human life and human liberty. And if capital punishment has
significant deterrent effects, then the moral argument for the ultimate penalty is
greatly strengthened--even, we think, to the point of raising the possibility that
capital punishment may be morally required.

50. Id. at 761.
51. This is Kant's "Formula of Humanity." See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998)

(1785).
52. Recall here the use of deadly force to stop hostage takers; in at least some cases of
that sort, the use of such force is obligatory from the moral point of view. See supra note 35
and accompanying text.
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